Introduction
The cryptographic power of a noisy channel has been demonstrated by Wyner 19] who showed that two honest parties, say A and B, can exchange a secret key on which an eavesdropper E may obtain only a small fraction of the information as long as A and B are connected by a Binary Symmetric Channel of better quality than a similar Channel connecting them to E. More recently, a result of Bennett, Brassard, Cr epeau and Maurer 1] provides a technique called Generalized Privacy Ampli cation to ensure that E's information is an arbitrary small fraction of a bit under the same conditions. But cryptography is no longer interested solely in protecting communications. As a result of public-key cryptography, a large number of other cryptographic tasks have emerged. Examples of such tasks are Coin-ipping by telephone 3] and Mental Poker. These may involve two or more parties, some of which may be dishonest. The general concept of Distributed Function Evaluation was rst introduced by Yao 20] and later extended to \Mental Games" by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 12] .
Distributed Function Evaluation and Mental Games are multi-party algorithms which involve secret data that the parties want to keep from one another. In the model where we are ready to accept computational assumptions, such general tasks can be achieved from basic assumptions such as the existence of a One-Way Trapdoor Function 12] .
The lesson derived in the computational model is that very simple protocols are su cient to achieve the general ones. The two primitives known as Bit Commitment (de ned in Section 3) and Oblivious Transfer (de ned in Section 4) are elementary protocols that are su cient in general to accomplish any Mental Games, even in a non-computational scenario 14, 8] .
The current paper considers a scenario where only two people, A and B, are involved and where we put no limitation on their computing power. If we made no further assumption, it would be impossible to accomplish Mental Games.
Thus, the extra assumption we make is that A and B are connected by a Binary Symmetric Channel (BS ), that is a channel that will change the value of a bit b with probability as it travels from one party to the other.
A rst protocol to accomplish Oblivious Transfer from a Noisy Channel was presented in 9]. Unfortunately, that protocol is quite complex and requires (n 11 ) bits sent through the BSC to perform a single Oblivious Transfer, where n is a security parameter that speci es the reliability of the protocol. As a consequence, any two-party computations may be performed from the assumption that there exists a reliable BSC. The current solution is by far more e cient than those suggested earlier. The current paper provides a protocol for Bit Commitment that uses O(n) times the BS and a protocol for Oblivious Transfer that uses O(n 3 ) times that primitive, where n is a security parameter that speci es the probabilities of failure of the protocols. These probabilities are all exponentially small in n.
General Tools

Error Channel
We consider a standard error model: the binary symmetric channel. In the binary symmetric channel A sends a bit to B that is ipped with probability BS (x) = x with prob.
x with prob. 1 ? . By extension, we also write BS (w) as a shorthand for BS (w 1 )BS (w 2 ):::BS (w n ) when w = w 1 w 2 :::w n is an n{bit word. Let H( ) = ? lg ? (1 ? ) lg(1 ? ) be the binary entropy function. We de ne the channel capacity of the BS to be C = 1 ? H( ).
A nice property of the binary symmetric channel is that it is totally symmetrical between the participants: if B wants to send a bit x via BS (x) to A when it is only available from A to B, they can do as follows: Such a code is de ned as the linear combinations of the rows of a generating matrix G of dimension k n. Alternatively, C may be de ned as the kernel of a parity check matrix H of dimension n (n ? k). Knowledge of G or H is computationally equivalent as it is easy to get one from the other. For section 3 we need the well known fact 15, chap. 17, prob. (30) ] that there exists a constant > 1 such that a random binary matrix G of size Rn n de nes a binary linear code with minimal distance at least n except with probability not greater than (R?C )n , for values of R < C .
For section 4 we need codes that are e ciently decodable with high correction rate and high dimension. For this purpose we use concatenated codes de ned in 11] that are e ciently encoded and decoded. Asymptotically, very long n; Rn; d] concatenated codes may be constructed in such a way that for every > 0 there exists a constant > 1 such that the codes fail to correct n errors except with probability not greater than (R?C )n , for values of R < C (although the minimum distance d may be somewhat smaller than n). Please consult 11] for more information on asymptotic performances of concatenated codes.
In some situations the information transmitted is not a codeword. In such a case, as long as the syndrome syn(w) = H > w of a word w is known the decoding algorithm may be used to recover w from a noisy version of that word and the value of syn(w). Please consult 15] for more information on coding theory. 
Generalized Privacy Ampli cation
Bit Commitment
Assume that a party, A, has a bit b in mind, to which she would like to be committed toward another party, B. That is, A wishes, through a procedure BC(b), to provide B with a piece of evidence w that she has a bit b in mind and that she cannot change it (binding). Meanwhile, B should not be able to tell from that evidence what b is (concealing). At a later time, A can reveal, through an unveiling procedure UN(b; p), the value of b and prove through p to B that the piece of evidence sent earlier (w) really corresponded to that bit.
Bit commitment schemes have several applications in the eld of cryptographic protocols. In particular one can implement zero-knowledge proofs of a variety of statements using bit commitment schemes 13, 4] . The rst implementations of bit commitment schemes were given in a computational complexity scenario 3]. Unfortunately, proofs of their (computational) security have always required an unproven assumption since otherwise they would imply very strong results such as P 6 = NP. This section is inspired by that work of 5] to achieve Bit Commitment in the model of Quantum Cryptography.
Bit Commitment from Binary Symmetric Channel
Intuition behind Protocols BC & UN After establishing a proper errorcorrecting code, A sends a codeword from that code to B through the BS . The code is such that B should have many candidates for A's codeword after seeing it through the BS . The secret bit of A is given by applying a random function from a universal 2 class to the codeword. To unveil her bit, A discloses her codeword. She should not be able to announce two codewords that B will nd close enough to the word he received to believe her.
Formal Protocol Let be the error probability of the channel, and < 1 be a positive number. Let > 0 be such that H( ) ? > H( ) and such that (H( ) ? )n is an integer. The following protocols work for any value of such that 0 < < 1=2, in contrast to the protocols of Section 4. Details of the Protocol In the above Protocol BC we ask B to choose a code with speci c parameters. The e ect of these parameters on the security of the protocol explain why we require B to do this job and not A: the bigger d is, the more unlikely it is for A to cheat and the bigger k is, the more unlikely it is for B to cheat. Coding theory give us limits on how big d and k can be at the same time. In order to have them as large as possible at the same time, the best construction known to this day is to pick the generating matrix of the code at random. Nevertheless, in this case the value of k is easy to gure out from the matrix (the rank of the matrix) while the exact value of d is more di cult to determine. All we know is that it is likely to be high. As discussed in Sect. 2.2, a random binary matrix G of size Rn n de nes a binary linear code with minimal distance at least n except with probability (R?C )n , thus B has an exponentially small probability of having d too small when he picks a k n matrix at random. A can easily verify that the value of k is correct.
The random vector m is used to de ne a Privacy Ampli cation Function of f0; 1g n to f0; 1g. is exponentially small in n for all su ciently small, and all su ciently large n.
Analysis of the Protocol
Thus any < (1=2 ? )=2 will satisfy our requirements that an honest A succeeds except with probability exponentially small in n, while a dishonest A succeeds to open both ways only with probability exponentially small in n.
Oblivious Transfer
One-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer, denoted ( 2 1 ){OT, is a primitive that originates with 18] (under the label of \multiplexing"). According to this primitive, one party A owns two secret strings w 0 and w 1 These two simple cryptographic tools have been extensively studied by several researchers because they turned out to be elementary blocks to build more elaborate cryptographic tasks known as \secure computations". This idea introduced by Yao 20] Intuition behind Protocol ? 2 1 { d
OT For this rst protocol we assume A behaves honestly and will remove this assumption in the nal protocol. The idea of the rst protocol is that A sends 2n random bits r 1 ; r 2 ; :::; r 2n to B using d
OT . B should receive roughly 2 n of these and lose 2(1 ? )n. B forms two sets I 0 ; I 1 of size n and thus de nes two strings r 0 I0 ; r 0 I1 of size n (r 0 restricted to I 0 and I 1 ).
String r Ic should be entirely known by B, while string r I c should be partially unknown by B. Nevertheless, because d
OT is imperfect, we expect an average of ' 2 n di erences between r Ic and r 0 Ic . A code is established between the parties to correct more than ' 2 n errors except with exponentially small probability in n.
The errors are corrected by having A send the syndrome of the two words syn(r I0 ); syn(r I1 ). Using r 0 Ic and syn(r Ic ), B may recover r Ic except with small probability of failure. Nevertheless, this correction information is not su cient to nd out both words r Ic ; r I c accurately, as long as the dimension of the code is somewhat greater than n.
A privacy ampli cation function is nally used to extract one secret bit per string, so that one bit may be recovered by B but not both. This function is the scalar product by a random n-bit word m.
Imcomplete Protocol Let be a number greater than 1. ' (not for all '). B is unable to cheat this protocol because whatever way he splits the \good" bits (r 0 i 6 = ") between I 0 ; I 1 , he will not be able to put more ( + =2)n good bits in at least one of I 0 or I 1 . Since k > ( + )n then syn(r I0 ); syn(r I1 ) each contain n ? k bits of information, i.e. no more than (1 ? ? =2)n bits. Thus, at least one of the two words r I0 ; r I1 will be undetermined by at least n=2 = n?(1+ )n=2?(1=2? )n bits. Using privacy ampli cation, this word will contain an exponentially small amount of information about its related bit. Therefore, B cannot learn both of A's bits. Unfortunately, A can cheat this protocol in two di erent ways that allow her to gure out B's secret input c: at Step 2 A can send \bad" pairs r i r i or r i r i instead of r i r i increasing the probability that it is lost (r 0 i = ") by B and at
Step 4 she can send a \bad" syndrome leading B to a decoding error. In the rst cheat, \bad" pairs are more likely to end up in the \bad" set thus indicating to A which one is more likely to be the \good" and \bad" sets. In the second cheat, if A makes only one syndrome bad then B might have to abort depending on which bit he is trying to get. OT is repeated n 2 times. We combine the n 2 instances of ? 2 1 { d
OT in such a way that A must cheat in each instance if she wants to discover the value of c. Protocol d
OT is used a total of 2n 3 times. In order to obtain information A must send at least n 2 bad pairs in these protocols. This will make a statistical di erence that will be detected with probability almost 1. If A uses less than n 2 bad pairs, she nds out nothing about c. Similarly, if A sends bad syndromes in protocol ? 2 1 { d
OT with probability 1=2 she will be detected by B because he reads according to a random choice. If she uses O(n) such syndromes it is almost certain that B will detect her cheating.
Let n be an odd number. Thus, except with exponentially small probability, an honest A will pass the test of Step 4 while a dishonest A will fail that same test.
If A is honest, the probability that more than ' 2 n errors occur during transmission by accident is exponentially small. Thus an honest A who sends correct syndromes, is unlikely to fail the test of Step 3.2 while a dishonest A who deliberately sends a wrong syndrome will be detected with probability 1=2, if B happens to use that syndrome at random. 
